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We propose and analyze a new concept for secure key distribution based on establishing laser
oscillations between the sender and receiver. Compared to quantum mechanics based systems, our
scheme allows for significantly higher key-establishing rates and longer ranges. By properly designing
the laser structure, it is possible to increase the difficulty of eavesdropping almost arbitrarily, thus making
our scheme an intriguing alternative and a complementary technology to quantum key-distribution
systems.
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The distribution of a secret key is most probably the
main Achilles’ heel of any secure communication system.
To establish a completely secure information transfer, it is
necessary for the two users to share a secret key, known
only to them, before the communication can take place [1].
In many practical scenarios, especially when the two users
are separated by a large distance, this requirement is diffi-
cult to realize because secure transmission of the key
requires a previously shared (additional) key. This loop-
hole was one of the main incentives behind the attempts to
develop physically (as opposed to algorithmically) secure
key-distribution schemes based on the fundamental prop-
erties of quantum mechanics [2–5]. Although ideally such
communication protocols are perfectly secure [6], their
practical implementation is not simple. Noise and attenu-
ation in the quantum channel reduce significantly their
efficiency, especially from the range and data rate aspects.
Theoretical and experimental studies show that channel
attenuation, noise, and detector dark counts limit the key-
establishing rates and the operational ranges of quantum
key-distribution (QKD) systems [3,7–11].
Recently, a classical key-distribution system (KDS) uti-
lizing Johnson noise in resistors was suggested [12,13].
Although conceptually interesting, the suggested scheme
was found to be vulnerable to an analysis of the transients
of the electromagnetic waves propagating in the transmis-
sion line connecting the two parties [14]. Here we propose
and analyze a new concept for key distribution, based on
establishing a laser oscillation between the sender and
receiver. The suggested architecture offers potential key-
establishing rates which are larger by several orders of
magnitude than those of the currently demonstrated QKD
systems, especially at long communication ranges.
Referring to Fig. 1, the system consists of a long erbium-
doped fiber laser with Alice at one end and Bob on the
other. In the example depicted in Fig. 1, Bob and Alice can
each choose independently a mirror from a set of three
mirrors (one set at each end), labeled ‘‘T,’’ ‘‘1,’’ and ‘‘0’’
(see the inset in Fig. 1), and use it as the laser reflector at
their end. Each of the three mirrors in a set has its peak at a
different frequency. The T mirror is centered on !0, mir-
ror 1 is centered on !0  !, and mirror 0 is centered on
!0-!. The erbium-doped amplifiers (EDFA) provide the
optical gain for the laser, and the inline filters IFA and IFB
are narrow-band filters centered at !0. Each communica-
tion cycle (i.e., the generation of a bit for the key) starts
with Alice and Bob placing their mirror at !0 (T). This
phase resets the symmetry of the system and establishes
synchronization. Next, they each randomly select a bit (i.e.,
0 or 1) and switch on the appropriate mirror. The laser gain
is maintained at a level such that if they pick different bits,
there is sufficient gain for the laser to lase at !0 but at a
lower amplitude compared to the T state. If they both
choose 1, the lasing wavelength shifts to !0  !, and
if they choose 0, the lasing wavelength shifts to !0-!
(see also Fig. 3).
The choice of mirrors determines the lasing character-
istics of the laser, allowing each of the two parties to
deduce which mirror was selected at the other end and,
thus, to exchange a bit. To achieve security, the determi-
nation of the mirrors’ choice should be simple for legiti-
FIG. 1 (color online). GFL system for secure key distribution.
MA, MB: Alice’s and Bob’s end mirrors; IFA, IFB: inline filters;
NSA, NSB: broadband noise sources. Inset: Frequency response
of the three mirrors at the three different states.
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mate users but very difficult (ideally impossible) for an
eavesdropper (Eve). Thus, the KDS should effectively
serve as a ‘‘physical’’ one-way function. A straightforward
way to accomplish that is by devising a system which
indicates only the correlation (the XOR value) between
the bits selected by the two parties. For Alice and Bob
(who know their own bit), the correlation is sufficient to
determine the values of both bits, but for Eve it is not.
The security level provided by the giant fiber laser
(GFL) system is determined by the ability of Eve to extract
more information than merely the correlation between the
bits. To quantify this capability, a more detailed model of
the scheme is considered. Referring to Fig. 1, the electro-
magnetic field evolving in the laser is a superposition of
rightward and leftward propagating waves [A! and
A!, respectively], defined at the middle of the system
(z  L=2). The lengths of the laser and the active region
are L and d, respectively.
In each round-trip, the (complex) amplitude of, say, A
is filtered by IFA and amplified by Alice’s EDFA, reflected
from MA, and then amplified and filtered again to generate
the right propagating wave A. In each amplification stage,
the spontaneous emission (SE) noise of the EDFA is added
to the propagating field. A similar relation connects A to
A, thus yielding the following coupled equations for the
evolution of the field amplitudes:
 
Al1 !  fAl! exp12iLTIF! expd=2
 AS!rA! expd=2
 AS!gTIF! exp12iL  NA!;
Al1 !  fAl! exp12iLTIF! expd=2
 AS!rB! expd=2
 AS!gTIF! exp12iL  NB!;
(1)
where l indicates the round-trip index (or, equivalently,
time), rA and rB are, respectively, the spectral reflectance
of Alice’s and Bob’s mirrors, TIF is the transmittance of the
inline filter,  is the (complex) propagation factor, NA and
NB are the signals generated by the optional external noise
sources NSA and NSB, whose significance is explained
further below. The overall gain in the active part is given
by expd=2, where  is the gain coefficient given by
[15]:
 !  0!
1 I=ISAT ; (2)
where 0! is the small signal (i.e., unsaturated) gain of
the medium as determined by the pumping level, and I is
the overall intensity of the field in the active medium given
by I  RjA!j2  jA!j2d!, where ISAT is the
saturation intensity. Both the gain  and the spontaneous
emission power are proportional to the population inver-
sion N, and, thus, the spontaneous emission amplitude
emitted from a dz thick slice of the active medium is
proportional to p dz. Taking into account the amplifica-
tion of the SE in the active region, the power emitted from
either side of the active medium (due to SE) is
 AS!  2Kp expd=2  1; (3)
where K is a proportion coefficient linking the square root
of the gain to the emitted amplified spontaneous emission.
To examine the security of the scheme, we need to
outline the reasonable eavesdropping strategies Eve can
employ. For simplicity, we initially analyze the GFL sys-
tem without the external noise sources (NA  NB  0).
We assume that Eve can tap the field evolving in the laser
without being detected and perform any type of measure-
ment. In particular, Eve can introduce a beam splitter (or a
fiber coupler) into the cavity, separate A from A, and
analyze them separately. Like any classical electromag-
netic wave, A can be completely characterized by their
spectral and temporal evolution—information which is
available to Eve.
Is the scheme secure? Can Eve use her measurement of
A to determine which mirror was selected by Bob and
which by Alice? Figure 2 depicts the laser output power at
!0 for a sequence of bit selection, found by numerically
integrating (1). The parameters of the system are defined in
the figure caption. The power levels clearly distinguish
between correlated (A  B) and anticorrelated (A  B)
bits. Note that, in the case of the anticorrelated bits, the
intensities of A are indistinguishable (although they are
reflected from different mirrors), making it impossible for
FIG. 2 (color online). Power traces of the left (dotted line) and
right (dashed line) propagating waves for various bits selection
by Alice and Bob. The link length is L  10 km, K0  3:2	
104 m1, d  0:1 m, and Isat  10 [normalized units]. The
mirrors are implemented by fiber Bragg gratings with 3 dB
bandwidth of 
20 GHz and maximal reflection of 
99%. The
offset between the 1 and 0 mirrors is 4 GHz. The inline filter
bandwidth is 
2 GHz. The power levels are normalized to
1 mW.
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Eve to learn of the choice of mirrors by monitoring the
power.
Figure 3 illustrates the steady-state spectrum of the four
different states of the system. The spectra of the 1; 1 and
0; 0 cases differ significantly, making it possible for Eve
to distinguish between them. These bits cannot be used to
attain secure communication and are, therefore, discarded.
The spectra of the anticorrelated bits 1; 0 and 0; 1 are
very similar though not identical—the spectra of A and
A are mirror images of each other about !0  A!
!0  A!0 !. Nevertheless, the difference is very
small, thus compelling Eve to be able to distinguish be-
tween signals which are 40 dB below the lasing power.
These bits are, therefore, retained and are added to the key.
In principle, Eve can determine the exchanged bit in the
anticorrelated bits case by careful examination of the spec-
trum of A. However, the difference between the two
spectra can be made essentially as small as desired, and
thus subvert Eve’s spying, by including additional inline
filtering in the laser. To demonstrate this point, we depict in
Fig. 4(a) the powers of A at !0 for the same sequence of
bits as in Fig. 2 when an additional, and similar, inline filter
centered at !0 is employed. Figures 4(b)–4(d) show the
corresponding spectra of A for correlated bits [Fig. 4(b)]
and for the two anticorrelated bits possibilities. While the
additional filtering does not significantly affect the lasing
intensity, its impact on the spectra at the anticorrelated
states is dramatic [see Figs. 4(c) and 4(d)]. The ratio of
the spectra of A and A is reduced to less than 0.5 dB at
the 45 dB level, compared to 
3 dB in the case of a
single inline filter (Fig. 3).
Thus, the difference between the spectra of A can be
reduced almost arbitrarily, making the task of determining
the exchanged bit technologically difficult for Eve. The last
property is of supreme importance, because any practical
measurement performed by Eve is limited by the noise
floor and the dynamic range of her apparatus. Therefore,
the communicating parties can always reduce the signature
of their bit selection (imprinted in the SE spectrum of the
laser) below Eve’s detection capability and achieve secure
key distribution. Alternatively (or in parallel), the noise
level in the system can be increased by injecting into the
fiber noise from an external broadband source (see Fig. 1),
thus ‘‘drowning’’ the faint signals Eve is trying to detect in
noise, without affecting the primary laser oscillations.
Thus, in contrast to QKD systems (QKDS), noise is not
an ‘‘enemy’’ but rather an ‘‘ally’’ which helps concealing
the exchanged bit from Eve.
Eve may also try to actively probe the mirrors’ reflection
spectrum in order to determine Alice’s and Bob’s choice of
mirrors. In this case, Eve’s injected signal would be am-
plified by the EDFAs and could be detected by Alice and
Bob. A detailed analysis of this scenario is, however,
beyond the scope of this Letter.
In addition to simplicity, the GFL-KDS also provides an
enhanced key-establishing rate (compared to QKDS), es-
pecially at long ranges. The minimal time it takes a laser to
establish oscillations or to shift its lasing wavelength is
determined by the round-trip time   2Ln=c, where c is
the speed of light in vacuum. For simplicity, we assume
that the state of the system can be determined after 
10.
Therefore, the maximal key-establishing rate is given by:
 fmax  c=L20n : (4)
Note that the key-establishing rate decreases as
logfmax 
  logL for the GFL system, while for
QKDS this rate decreases as logfmax 
 L, where 
FIG. 4 (color online). Time trace intensities (a) and steady-
state spectra for a GFL with additional (identical) inline filtering
for (b) Alice  “1”, Bob  “1”; (c) Alice  “1”, Bob  “0”;
and (d) Alice  “0”, Bob  “1”.
FIG. 3 (color online). Steady-state spectra of the rightward
(A) and leftward (A) waves of a GFL with a single inline
filter for (a) Alice  “1”, Bob  “1”; (b) Alice  “0”, Bob 
“0”; (c) Alice  “1”, Bob  “0”; and (d) Alice  “0”, Bob 
“1”.
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is the loss coefficient in the fiber (imaginary part of ).
Thus, as the length of the link increases, the GFL-KDS
becomes more attractive. As a concrete example, we com-
pare fmax for the GFL-KDS and the measured rate of the
QKDS studied in Ref. [10]. Figure 5 depicts a comparison
between the key-establishing rates of the two systems. As
the link length increases to more than 48 km, the GFL
system wins out.
The GFL scheme offers several advantages compared to
QKDS, especially from the aspects of key-establishing
rates and link ranges. In addition, the realization of such
a system does not require the development of sophisticated
technologies such as single photon sources and detectors,
quantum repeaters, etc. Analogues to classical cryptogra-
phy, the GFL-KDS realizes a ‘‘one-way technological
function’’ in the sense that deciphering the message is
technologically difficult for an adversary but simple for
legitimate users. The theoretical but not necessarily real-
world disadvantage of our system is that, like any classical
cryptography scheme, it does not provide unconditional
security. In particular, unlike QKDS, it cannot provide an
indication for eavesdropping and a bound on the informa-
tion gained by the adversary. Nevertheless, such a scheme
may prove to be a practical solution for secure key distri-
bution and deserves serious consideration as a building
block for secure communication solutions, especially for
long haul links.
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